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Although the self-selection of emigrants is determined by di⁄erences in the returns
to education, according to the celebrated Roy model, empirical evidence suggests
that migrants tend to be favorably selected. This paper argues that ￿nancial con-
straints might be useful to explain this controversy. These constraints might impose
positive correlations between (i) wealth and education, and (ii) wealth and migra-
tion, implying a positive bias in the empirical results. We also show that high levels
of migration premium and return to education in the source country explain the
migration of middle-class individuals, a situation in which migration increases in-
equality in the home country.
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Typically, emigrants do not represent a random sample of the source popu-
lation. A central question in the literature is whether they are positively or
negatively self-selected [Chiswick (1978), Borjas (1987)]. How do the workers
who leave a country compare to the ones who don￿ t? Are they more or less
educated than the average worker? This issue is essential to determine what
the impacts of migration are on the source and destination countries, and is
consequently crucial for discussions about migration policies. 1
Based on the celebrated paper by Roy (1951), Borjas (1987) suggests that the
selection of a certain ability depends on the sign of the di⁄erence between the
rate of return to this characteristic in the source and destination countries.
For example, considering the case of education, emigrants tend to be positively
(negatively) self-selected - i.e, more educated than the average worker in the
source country - if the rate of return to education is lower (higher) in the
domestic economy. 2 However, empirical evidence points to a positive selection
of emigrants even when the rate of return to education is higher in the source
country. 3 According to Chiswick (1999), ￿one of the standard propositions in
the migration literature is that economic migrants tend to be favorably ￿ self-
selected￿for labor market success.￿
1 See Borjas (1995) for further discussion about the topic.
2 See also Locher (2004) and Freeman (1993).
3 See Borjas, Bronars and Trejo (1992) and Chiquiar and Hanson (2002).
2The paper aims at proposing a possible explanation for this controversy by
relying on ￿nancial constraints. An important consequence of imperfections in
￿nancial or credit markets is that agents￿choices become wealth-constrained.
In the study of self-selection of emigrants, the relevant choices are investments
in education and in the decision to migrate, both of which are positively
correlated with wealth in most cases. Therefore, an empirical analysis that
does not take this e⁄ect into account might be (positively) biased. In addition,
the interaction between ￿nancial constraints and Roy￿ s argument provides an
economic reasoning for middle-class migration from developing countries.
Many authors recognize the importance of ￿nancial constraints for migration
decisions. For Greenwood (1997), ￿to some extent, migration appears to be a
function of the assets that a household has to cover the cost of moving. Lack of
assets may impede mobility.￿Chiswick (1999) shares the same point of view:
￿Migration occurs if the rate of return from the investment in migration is
greater than or equal to the interest cost of funds for investment in human
capital. The interest costs of funds is lower, the greater the person￿ s wealth
and access to the capital market.￿4
Despite these contributions, no systematic analysis has been done so far of the
importance of incentives and wealth constraints to the migration decision. The
4 On the other hand, Stark and Taylor (1991) claim that not only does absolute
income matter for the propensity of migration, but also that individuals might decide
to migrate because of relative deprivation with respect to other individuals living
nearby. Their evidence suggests that international migration is positively correlated
with absolute income and relative deprivation.
3literature has been neglecting the role of credit constraints in the self-selection
of migrants.
The nature of the impact of ￿nancial constraints on education and migration
is twofold. First, they might be positively correlated because rich individuals
can a⁄ord both education and migration costs. Poor people, on the other
hand, remain in the home country with low levels of education. Second, there
is a potential negative correlation between migration and education because
these choices are traded o⁄in the budget constraint. Especially in cases where
the migration cost is not too high, the ￿rst case prevails and thus ￿nancial
constraints determine a positive selection bias of emigrants. Therefore, if there
are ￿nancial constraints, we might observe positively selected emigrants even
when the rate of return to education is lower in the destination country.
This argument can also explain a very striking question: why are most em-
igrants leaving some developing countries from middle-class? We show that
this phenomenon might happen when the migration premium - de￿ned as the
di⁄erence between the wages of a worker with zero years of schooling in the
two countries discounted by the cost of migration - and return to education
in the source country are both high. This implies that rich people will obtain
high levels of education and will stay in their country - the income generated
from the accumulation of human capital surpasses the migration premium
for them. Poors also remain at home because they cannot a⁄ord migration
costs. Middle-class individuals, on the other hand, decide to migrate, since
4they cannot get enough education to compensate for the migration premium.
In the Roy model, most emigrants from a given source country are drawn from
one of the tails of the education distribution. Therefore, it suggests migration
decreases inequality in the home country. The theoretical possibility suggested
in the model presented in this article - which has a relevant empirical coun-
terpart 5 - is that migration might increase inequality once it is possible that
the majority of emigrants are from middle-class backgrounds.
Banerjee and Kanbur (1981) were the ￿rst to suggest why the middle-class
is the most mobile one in some situations. They argue that the bene￿ts of
looking for a job abroad are concave with respect to income while search
costs are linear. Hence, they get inverted U-shaped net bene￿ts of migration.
Mckenzie and Rapoport (2003) also argue and show empirical evidence of
an inverted U-shaped relationship between migration and wealth, relying on
social networks. Chiquiar and Hanson (2002), in their turn, show that workers
with intermediate level of schooling might be the ones with higher incentives
to migrate if migration costs are decreasing in the skill level. In our model, this
pattern is neither generated by technological issues nor by the endogeneity of
moving costs due to social networks as suggested by Carrington, Detragiache
and Vishwanath (1996). We show that the introduction of ￿nancial constraints
in the Roy model, considering exogenous migration costs, might generate an
inverted U-shaped relationship between migration and wealth for the case
5 Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) is an example.
5with high levels of migration premium and return to education in the source
economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section establishes
the basic notation and analyzes the case with no ￿nancial constraints. In
section 3, we derive the main results of the paper. Concluding remarks are
presented in the last section.
2 The basic model
This section presents the basic setup of the model in a context with no ￿nancial
constraints. The model focuses on the decisions of migration and education in
the source economy. 6 We consider a very simple structure with two countries,
where label 0 represents the source and 1 the destination. All individuals are
identical except for their initial wealth a and skill ￿, with utility function
represented by u(c) = c, where c denotes the consumption of a composite
good with price normalized to 1.
Individuals in country 0 decide about consumption, education and migration.
At the beginning of their life, they decide about education and migration. At
the end of the period, they work, receive wages and consume.
To simplify the presentation of our main argument, we assume perfect fore-
6 Sjaastad (1962) was the ￿rst to suggest a connection between migration and
human capital investments.
6sight about labor markets in both countries. There is no uncertainty and the
wage schedules are perfectly anticipated by everyone. Also, there are no issues
regarding the duration of the migration such as in Dustmann (2003).
Since we are establishing a benchmark, without ￿nancial constraints, the wages
obtained afterwards can be used to ￿nance current consumption and to cover
the costs of education and migration. Therefore, the choices of an agent of
type (a;￿) who decides to work in country j are restricted only by a budget
constraint, which is given by:
c + m(ej￿) + j M = a + w
j (e); (1)
where wj (e) is the (exogenously given) wage schedule for a worker with ed-
ucation level e ￿ 0 in country j 2 f0;1g, M is the cost of migration, 7 and
m(ej￿) is the cost of education for an individual with skill ￿. 8 We assume that
wj
e > 0, wj
ee < 0, wj (0) = ￿ wj > 0, me > 0, mee > 0, me￿ < 0 and m(0j￿) = 0.
Notice that the assumption me￿ < 0 establishes that skilled individuals have
a lower marginal cost of education.
The optimal choice of an individual in country 0, after substituting (1), can
7 We consider, without loss of generality, only a one-time cost of moving. Evidently,
there are many other recurrent costs regarding adaptation, language and cultural
di⁄erences, visits to the home country, or even costs of discrimination. However,
those are either non-monetary costs or monetary costs which will be paid some time
after migration has occurred. Our analysis does not depend upon this assumption.
8 The interest rate is normalized to 0 to simplify the notation.
7be represented by the following program:
max
j;ej￿0 a + w
j (ej) ￿ m(ejj￿) ￿ j M: (2)
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For each pair (a;￿), the system (3)-(5) determines all relevant variables in
the model. Equation (5) determines whether each individual migrates or not.










From the above expression it becomes clear that workers invest more (less)
in education when they decide to migrate if the return to education is higher
(lower) in the labor market of the destination country. Note that the decision
on how much to invest in education does not depend on the migration cost M.
The migration cost is only important in the extent that it determines which
9 Throughout the analysis, we assume that the conditions of the economy are such
that the interior solution characterizes the optimal levels of education.
8agents emigrate. The next step is to de￿ne the selection bias.
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From the Envelope Theorem, me￿ < 0 and (6), we can show that:
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i.e., skilled workers are more likely to emigrate if the education premium is
higher in the destination country. Although we have generated an endogenous
educational distribution for reasons which will soon become clear, Roy￿ s result
is still valid in this context. Emigrants are positively self-selected if the return
to education is lower in the source economy. Skilled workers, the ones with
high ￿, decide to migrate once their comparative advantage is more valuable in
country 1. On the other hand, if w1
e < w0
e, more educated and skilled workers
prefer to remain in the home economy - emigrants are negatively selected.
Thus, given a sample of individuals with di⁄erent skills, the selection of em-
igrants is completely determined by the di⁄erences in the returns to educa-
tion in the two countries. 10 Despite the composition of the ￿ ow, migration
10 Borjas (1987) makes a distinction between the sign of selection of emigrants, the
￿composition￿and the ￿scale￿e⁄ects. The ￿scale￿e⁄ect measures the impact on
the quality of emigrants when the size of the ￿ ow is increased (and the mix of the
9decreases inequality since the individuals staying in country 0 become more
homogeneous.
A key feature provided by the assumption of perfect credit markets is the
fact that the decisions of education and migration are not a⁄ected by initial
wealth, which determines only the level of consumption. In the next section,
when ￿nancial constraints are introduced, initial wealth becomes crucial for
the choices of education and migration. Another interesting characteristic of
this benchmark case is that the migration premium, de￿ned as ￿ w1 ￿ ￿ w0 ￿M,
does not a⁄ect the selection of emigrants. These ￿ndings are summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Without ￿nancial constraints, emigrants tend to be positively
(negatively) self-selected if the return to education in the destination country
is higher (lower). In this case, initial wealth does not a⁄ect the composition
or the size of the migration ￿ow. Moreover, the migration premium does not
a⁄ect the selection of emigrants and migration decreases inequality.
3 The role of ￿nancial constraints
This section studies the impact of ￿nancial constraints on the selection of
emigrants, when there is no credit market to ￿nance agents￿choices. We begin
migration ￿ ow is held constant) while the ￿composition￿e⁄ect measures the impact
on the quality of emigrants when the size is held constant.
10the analysis with the ￿nancial constraints. Since agents have no access to
credit, their choices are wealth-constrained. Individuals choose how to allocate
their resources among educational costs and the cost of migration:
m(ejj￿) + j M ￿ a: (9)
After having incurred such costs, they spend the available income (wages plus
the remaining wealth) to ￿nance consumption:
cj = a ￿ m(ejj￿) ￿ j M + wj (e): (10)
Thus, the optimum choice of an individual in country 0 is represented by the
following problem:
max
j;ej￿0 a ￿ m(ejj￿) ￿ j M + w
j (ej) s.t. m(ejj￿) + j M ￿ a: (11)
The (interior) solution is given by the following system of equations 11
w
j
e (~ ej) =
￿
1 + ~ ￿j
￿
me (~ ejj￿); (12)
11 For the sake of simpli￿cation, we focus on the interior solution, ignoring the
constraints ej ￿ 0. Therefore, we need to address this issue. The condition e1 ￿ 0
clearly binds for those individuals with a ￿ M. We deal with this possibility by
adding a condition a > M for those choosing to migrate, i.e., ~ j = 1.
11~ ￿j (a ￿ m(~ ejj￿) ￿ j M) = 0; ~ ￿j ￿ 0; (13)
~ cj = a + w
j (~ ej) ￿ m(~ ejj￿) ￿ ~ j M; (14)
~ j = 1 () ~ B ￿ ~ c1 ￿ ~ c0 ￿ 0 and a > M; (15)
where ~ ￿j is the multiplier associated with (9). Whenever ￿nancial constraints
bind, initial wealth appears as a determinant of investments in education and
in the migration decision. From (12), we can see that individuals with type
(a;￿) such that ~ ￿j > 0 get less education with respect to the case of perfect
credit markets.
Based on the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, it is very useful to represent
the wage schedule in country j as
w







where ￿ wj = wj (0). Therefore, the wage gain determined by migration can be
decomposed into two parts - a migration premium and di⁄erences in the re-
turns to education. Formally, for a given level e of education, the Fundamental
12Theorem of Calculus can be used to write:
w
1 (e) ￿ w
0 (e) ￿ M = ￿ w
1 ￿ ￿ w















di⁄erences in the returns to education
(17)
Now, we will investigate the e⁄ect of wealth on education and on the net
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me(~ ejj￿); if ~ ￿j > 0;
0; otherwise.
(18)
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12 Notice that we are considering only people with a > M for the comparative static
in order to avoid kinks determined by corner solutions with ~ e1 = 0.
13Initial wealth a⁄ects education and the willingness to migrate only if the
￿nancial constraint binds. Rich people - those who are not wealth-constrained
- make the same decisions taken in the context with perfect credit markets.
Our analysis, which is characterized by the system (12)-(15), is divided into
two steps. First, we equalize the returns to education in the two countries to
focus on the role of the migration premium. The objective is to show that
there is a selection bias due to ￿nancial constraints, even when the Roy model
suggests no bias at all. Then, we drop this assumption and present the com-
plete case in which the migration premium is combined with the di⁄erences
in the returns to education.
3.1 Migration premium
The previous section presented the general problem. Here, we equalize the
returns to education in both economies: w1
e (e) = w0
e (e) = we (e) for all e ￿ 0.
The intention is to show that there is a selection due to ￿nancial constraints
even though the Roy model suggests no bias. Therefore, empirical tests that
do not control for ￿nancial constraints might wrongly reject the Roy model.
We also assume that the migration premium is strictly positive, i.e., ￿ w1￿ ￿ w0 >
M. Otherwise, there would be no incentives for agents to emigrate and the
problem would not be economically interesting.
14The following lemma is a very useful starting point for our analysis.
Lemma 2 For the case where wj
e (e) = we (e) for all e ￿ 0 and j 2 f0;1g,
~ e0 ￿ ~ e1 for each individual in the economy. Moreover, ~ e0 = ~ e1 for uncon-
strained individuals.
PROOF. see appendix.
The intuition for this result is simple. As we have equalized the returns to
education in the two labor markets, an additional unit of education has the
same value in terms of wages whether the individual decides to migrate or not.
In other words, the optimal unconstrained level of investments in education is
the same in both countries. On the other hand, agents who choose to emigrate
have (weakly) fewer resources to invest in education. Thus, we conclude that
~ e0 ￿ ~ e1 if the returns to education in both countries are the same.
















since ~ e0 ￿ ~ e1, wee < 0 and mee > 0. Therefore, for all ￿nancially constrained
individuals, the net bene￿t of emigration is a (strictly) increasing function of
initial wealth.
Now, we are ready to analyze the decision to invest in education and the deci-
15sion to emigrate in terms of initial wealth. The ￿rst thing to note is that work-
ers with wealth lower than M cannot migrate. Workers with wealth greater
than M have to trade o⁄ migration and education. Everyone who decides to
migrate has less money to invest in education. Thus, the individual has to
compare the migration premium with the reduction in wages due to lower lev-
els of education. On the other hand, unconstrained workers decide to migrate
once the migration premium is positive. As we go up in the wealth distribu-
tion, agents become able to ￿nance migration costs and acquire a higher level
of education. Figure (1) illustrates the education choice as a function of initial
wealth for a given level of skill.
Let ￿ a be the wealth level which makes e B = 0 so that the ￿rst worker to
emigrate has wealth ￿ a. We are under conditions such that ￿ a > M. The role
of the ￿nancial constraint in the selection of emigrants can be viewed as the
interaction of two opposite e⁄ects.
Since migration is costly, if credit constraints bind at ￿ a, individuals with initial
wealth slightly above ￿ a invest less in education than individuals with initial
wealth slightly below ￿ a. People in a neighborhood of ￿ a have to trade o⁄ ed-
ucation and migration. This component points in the direction of negatively
selected emigrants.
On the other hand, people at the bottom of the wealth distribution do not





























Fig. 1. Education and migration decisions vs. wealth - the case of positive migration
premium and the same returns to education.
ing in country 0 surpasses the bene￿t accruing from the migration premium.
Agents at the top of the wealth distribution emigrate to bene￿t from the mi-
gration premium. These two facts together contribute for positively selected
emigrants.
Except for an extreme case in which the migration costs are high and the
wealth distribution is highly concentrated around ￿ a, this second e⁄ect domi-
nates and ￿nancial constraints lead to a positive selection of emigrants even
when the education premium is the same in the source and destination coun-
tries. Again, in this case, migration decreases inequality because of the brain
drain e⁄ect. This result is described in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose there is a strictly positive migration premium and
there is no di⁄erence in the return to education in both countries, i.e., ￿ w1 ￿
￿ w0 > M and w1
e (e) = w0
e (e) = we (e) for all e ￿ 0. Financial constraints
produce a bias in the selection of emigrants. This bias tends to be positive if the
migration costs are not high and/or the wealth distribution is not concentrated
17around ￿ a. In this case, migration decreases inequality in the home country.
3.2 Migration premium and return to education
The next step is to allow for di⁄erent returns to education in the two countries,
which enables an analysis that considers the interaction of this e⁄ect with
￿nancial constraints. We will study the system (12)-(15), for the case in which
there is a positive migration premium and a higher return to education in
the home country. This is the most interesting case since the e⁄ects point in
opposite directions. While the positive migration premium tends to generate
a positive bias due to ￿nancial constraints, as shown in the previous section,
the higher return to education in the home country contributes to a negative
bias as in the Roy model.
Depending on the parameters of the economy, we can observe either a positive
or a negative selection of migrants. Moreover, this case is useful to explain the
migration of middle-class individuals which, in turn, determines that migra-
tion might increase inequality. The other three cases are less interesting for
our purposes because either there is no migration or the ￿nancial constraints
reinforce the Roy e⁄ect.
The net bene￿t of migration, according to (20), might not be a monotone
function of wealth. In contrast to the previous section, it may exhibit an
inverted U-shaped pattern. First, notice that w0
e (e) > w1
e (e) for all e ￿ 0
18contributes for negative values of (20). On the other hand, the same argument
used in the proof of the lemma can be applied to check that ~ e0 > ~ e1, which
tends to make (20) positive. 13
The intuition for this last fact is similar to the one used in the previous section.
Since the return to education is higher in the home country, individuals that
do not migrate get higher levels of education. In addition, ￿nancial constraints
determine that emigrants must have lower levels of education in order to a⁄ord
the migration costs.
Now, let us investigate the implications for the selection of the migration ￿ ow,
considering individuals with di⁄erent levels of initial wealth. Individuals from
the bottom of the wealth distribution prefer to remain in the home country,
using the resources that could be spent on migration to get a higher level of
education. The bene￿t of migration for these people is negative.
If the return to education in the home country is su¢ ciently higher, agents
from the top of the wealth distribution also stay in 0. In this case, the payo⁄
of getting a higher level of education compensates for the migration premium
and wealthy people decide to remain in their home country.
However, there might be a group of middle-class individuals who cannot a⁄ord
high levels of education, due to ￿nancial constraints, and prefer to migrate.
13 After all, the unconstrained optimal level of investments in education is higher in
the source country.
19The migration premium for them surpasses the bene￿t from the higher return
of education in the source country. This case contradicts the prescription of
the Roy model since emigrants are neither the most educated nor the least
educated individuals from country 0. This point is illustrated in Figure 2.









Fig. 2. Education and migration decisions vs. wealth - the case of positive migration
premium and higher return to education at the origin.
The introduction of ￿nancial constraints in the traditional Roy model provides
an interesting possible case where only middle-class individuals migrate and
migration increases inequality in the home country. This is a possibility when
the migration premium is positive and the return to education in the home
country is su¢ ciently higher than the return to education in the destination
country. The proposition below summarizes this result.
Proposition 4 Suppose there is a strictly positive migration premium and the
return to education is uniformly higher in the home country, i.e., ￿ w1￿ ￿ w0 > M
and w1
e (e) < w0
e (e) for all e ￿ 0. Then, we have shown that (i) there is an
ambiguous selection of emigrants, depending on the parameters of the economy;
and (ii) if these di⁄erences are su¢ ciently high, we might observe migration
20of middle-class individuals, a situation where migration increases inequality in
the home country.
4 Concluding Remarks
The literature has been neglecting the role of ￿nancial constraints in the se-
lection of emigrants. The theoretical arguments, based on the Roy model,
suggest that this selection is primarily determined by the di⁄erences in the
rate of return to education in the home and destination countries. On the other
hand, empirical evidence suggests that emigrants have higher levels of educa-
tion than those remaining at home, despite such di⁄erences in the returns to
education.
Our main contribution is to show that ￿nancial constraints play an important
role in the determination of the migration ￿ ow and might have unexpected
e⁄ects on inequality in the source economy. Our ￿ndings are based on two
results.
First, ￿nancial constraints tend to generate a positive bias in the selection in
the relevant cases. Without access to credit, poor people are neither able to get
high levels of education nor to migrate. Rich individuals, on the other hand,
can a⁄ord schooling and migration. Therefore, we provide a positive bias due
to wealth-constrained choices.
21This result is important to reconcile the theoretical and empirical literature on
migration. Financial constraints can determine a positive selection of migrants
even if the rate of return in the home country is lower. Therefore, empirical
investigation that does not control for initial wealth might wrongly reject the
Roy model.
Second, the interaction between the e⁄ects of ￿nancial constraints and the
di⁄erentials in the return to education explains facts that we were not able to
understand theoretically using the Roy framework. If the migration premium
is positive and the return to education in the home country is higher, we might
observe the migration of middle-class individuals and an increase in inequality
in the source country. This situation is in sharp contrast with the traditional
literature where migration reduces inequality.
Appendix
PROOF. Suppose that wj
e (e) = we (e) for all e ￿ 0 and j 2 f0;1g. The
result can be easily demonstrated if we split the population according to the
￿nancial constraint:
(i) For those individuals whose constraints are never binding
￿
~ ￿j = 0;j 2 f0;1g
￿
,
the analysis of section 2 (or equation 12) shows that ~ e0 = ~ e1.
(ii) When (9) is always binding
￿
~ ￿0 > 0; ~ ￿1 > 0
￿
, the education levels are
implicitly determined by m(~ e1j￿) = a ￿ M and m(~ e0j￿) = a. Since
22me > 0, it follows that ~ e1 < ~ e0.
(iii) For the case where the constraint binds only for the emigrants, i.e. ~ ￿0 = 0
and ~ ￿1 > 0, equation (12) implies that:
we (~ e1)
me (~ e1j￿)




Therefore, since wee < 0 and mee > 0, we have ~ e1 < ~ e0.
(iv) Nobody has ~ ￿0 > 0 and ~ ￿1 = 0. This situation is not possible when
wj
e (e) = we (e) - the ￿nancial constraint is tighter because of the migra-
tion costs.￿
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